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There are two varieties of timing games in economics: wars of attrition, in which
having more predecessors helps, and pre-emption games, in which having more
predecessors hurts. This paper introduces and explores a spanning class with
rank-order payoffs that subsumes both varieties as special cases. We assume time
is continuous, actions are unobserved, and information is complete, and explore
how equilibria of the games, in which there is shifting between phases of slow
and explosive (positive probability) stopping, capture many economic and social
timing phenomena. Inspired by auction theory, we ﬁrst show how each symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a different “potential function.” By using
this function, we straightforwardly obtain existence and characterization results.
Descartes’ Rule of Signs bounds the number of phase transitions. We describe
how adjacent timing game phases interact: war of attrition phases are not played
out as long as they would be in isolation, but instead are cut short by pre-emptive
atoms. We bound the number of equilibria, and compute the payoff and duration
of each equilibrium.
Keywords. Games of timing, war of attrition, preemption game.
JEL classification. C73, D81.
1. Introduction
Timing models in economics can be categorized into two classes. In the ﬁrst, delay is
exogenously costly, and each player prefers that others act before him. We tentatively
categorize such a model as a war of attrition. In the second, the situation is reversed; the
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passage of time is exogenously beneﬁcial, and players wish to pre-empt others. Such a
model is usually classiﬁed as a pre-emption game. There are, however, many important
strategic situations where players prefer to be neither ﬁrst nor last (ﬁxing the exogenous
environment). Such situations can capture many new behavioral phenomena, like mul-
tiple periods of slow stopping interspersed with sudden rushes. The goal of this paper
is to develop a foundation for a spanning class of timing games without restrictions on
rank order payoffs.
We develop a comprehensive theory for complete information timing games with
exogenous delay costs1 and assume that the rewards depend on the players’ ordinal
stoppingranks. Theserankrewardsshouldbeseenasareducedformforarichermodel,
sothatonecanfocusontheessenceofthetwostrategicforcesintiminggames. Theﬁrst
force arises in a (many-player) war of attrition, where early stoppers earn less than later
ones, so that players prefer a higher ordinal stopping rank. The opposing second force
is found in a pre-emption game, where people prefer a lower ordinal rank. In either
case, rewards are monotonic in the ordinal stopping ranks. Our formulation extends to
non-monotonic rank-rewards.
We assume unobservable actions; this assumption is necessary for tractability, al-
lowing us to use Nash equilibrium and thereby adapt ‘potential functions’ and bor-
row insights from mechanism design. “Silent timing games” capture economic envi-
ronments where timing decisions must be made well before the action begins, as with
high-tech market entry decisions, or the choice of release dates for movies. We also
posit discounting and known delay costs. As in most timing game papers, we focus on
symmetric equilibria in mixed strategies. This captures an anonymity of play natural in
many contexts. We also exclude strategies explicitly depending on focal calendar times
or random coordination devices like sunspots.
Our aim is to ﬁnd and characterize all the equilibria in this class, and we proceed
in two steps. First, we argue that the core elements of our game, the rank payoffs, are
fully and uniquely encoded in a function . This mapping corresponds to a thought
experiment in which all players employ an identical atomless strategy.
Second, we establish that every equilibrium of the game is equivalent to a unique
convexiﬁcation of the function , which we call a potential function. The key advantage
of this reformulation is that important qualitative features of behavior in an equilib-
rium can then easily be derived from properties of the corresponding potential func-
tion. The idea behind the convexiﬁcation procedure is that if later ranks secure less
valuable rewards than earlier ranks, then atoms endogenously arise in equilibrium to
makethecostlydelayworthwhile. Suchatomsguaranteethataplayerobtainsbothlarge
and small rank-payoffs with positive probability, thereby “ironing” players’ equilibrium
rank-order payoffs. And an ironed portion of the players’ rank payoffs corresponds to a
convexiﬁed portion of the representing function .
Such convexiﬁcations have many uses in economics (where they were originally
used in the study of auctions) and the sciences, but the spirit of all such applications
1Exogenous payoff growth over time, a feature often associated with pure pre-emption games, is an
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is that their gradient yields equilibrium expected payoffs (see footnote 11).2 One exam-
ple of a potential function is the convex hull of the function . Since it always exists,
this yields an immediate proof that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists (Theorem 1).
Myerson (1981) was the ﬁrst to adopt the notion of an “ironing board.” His function is
the maximum revenue auction and thus the convex hull of an integrated marginal rev-
enue function. By contrast, we desire all Nash equilibria, and therefore explore a local
convexiﬁcation notion. The convex hull corresponds to the equilibrium with the high-
est payoff loss due to delay. Our equilibrium characterization reduces to analyzing all
possible potential functions.
Toillustratetheequilibriumbehavior, considerthefollowingexample. Supposethat
a radio call-in show awards Stones tickets to the seventy-seventh caller. If the number
of other potential callers is known, and if waiting to call inﬂicts opportunity costs on
listeners, when should they call? Intuitively, players initially strategically beneﬁt from
the delay, but eventually succumb to a fear of missing out. How long will the game last?
What economic lessons can be gleaned from players’ equilibrium timing behavior?
One might well imagine that players wait to call, and suddenly call en masse, jam-
ming the phone lines. The prediction of our model is more subtle. Since delaying is
explicitly costly, agents are initially locked in a war of attrition. Everyone adopts a mixed
strategy, and the chance of winning is ever increasing. Ideally each wants to call when
the probability that seventy-six have called is maximal. At that moment, everyone else
woulddolikewise,triggeringexplosivecalling,whichwerefertoasastoppingatom. But
the story does not end there. Only one of the many callers can win, and thus the value of
the expected prize is lower compared to a situation where one calls just before this atom
and is the only caller who calls at that time. The pre-emption moment is thus pushed
earlier in time until everyone is indifferent between pre-empting the atom and calling
with the mass. Thus, the pre-emption atom ‘prematurely’ truncates the war of attrition
phase: relative to the direct sum of equilibria from two timing games,3 agents pre-empt
earlier and do so with an excessively large mass. Both the time and size of explosive
stopping moments are endogenous.
The motivational radio show example aside, our paper matches some other eco-
nomic applications. For instance, entry into a growing potential new market is often
mostproﬁtableforearlyﬁrmsaftertheleader,whostrugglewithneithermarketcreation
nor brand identiﬁcation. The social phenomenon of fashionable lateness bespeaks a
preference for a middling arrival rank. In rush hour one seeks to be early or late.
Moving on to characterizing the equilibria, we ﬁrst note that a war of attrition phase
obtains only for rising expected payoffs, when strategic and exogenous delay costs con-
ﬂict. Pre-emptive behavior is likewise mandated when expected rank payoffs fall. So the
slope-sign changes of expected payoffs are key. Theorem 2 bounds the number of phase
transitions by the underlying deterministic rank reward using Descartes’ Rule of Signs;
2Another example is a recent paper by Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2006), who use a convexiﬁcation tech-
nique to describe players’ synchronization behavior under uncertainty.
3In such a direct sum of equilibria, one would merely combine the equilibrium for the war of attrition,
which would be played for as long as possible, with the pre-emptive atom that is just large enough so that
decreasing rank payoffs are bunched together.234 Park and Smith Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
this provides a simple upper bound on the number of phase transitions and binds for
some equilibria.
With ever-increasing costs, pre-emptive behavior is synonymous with a positive
probability of stopping in an atom. A switch from a gradual war of attrition phase to
a pre-emptive atom (or back) can occur only if expected rank payoffs before and after
the atom and the payoff from stopping with the atom coincide. We then show that non-
atomic rank and atomic rewards relate as do marginals and averages (Lemma 2). We
build on this insight to deduce that any war of attrition phase ends before expected rank
payoffs peak and, following an atom, any war of attrition starts after rank payoffs trough
(Theorem3). Forthisreason, wesaythatthewaris‘truncated’andtheatomis‘inﬂated.’
We then determine how many equilibria the game may have. Since war of attri-
tion and pre-emption game phases alternate, the question is which consecutive pairs
are played. The number of equilibria is then found by simple combinatorics: with J
matched pairs of wars of attrition and pre-emption games, there are 2J potential Nash
equilibria (Theorem 4).
In the war of attrition, all rents—namely, the greatest minus the least expected rank
payoff—are dissipated. This is not true when rank order payoffs are non-monotonic. As
a result, the pre-emption games start when expected rank payoffs coincide with average
atomic payoffs, before the former peaks; thus, the maximal expected rank payoff is not
attained in equilibrium. Theorem 5 instead shows that the maximal payoff dissipation
in the game is captured not by a difference of expected rank payoffs, but by a difference
of the greatest backward average payoff and the least forward average payoff. Also, the
game’s expected payoff is at least the minimum of the forward average payoffs. This
contrasts with the war of attrition, where the value is the least expected rank payoff.
Ouranalysisyieldsaseparationofrankpayoffsandtimecosts. Sincecostsplayakey
role in determining equilibrium strategies, one might think that not much can be said
about the equilibrium without specifying the strategies. Yet the equilibrium is based
on the potential function. And this function is derived from the primitive rank payoffs
alone, thus determining an equilibrium for any time costs.
We conclude by brieﬂy considering observable actions. This produces multiple
information sets and vastly enriches the set of supportable equilibria (now subgame
perfect). Still, we brieﬂy argue that our main qualitative insight about atom inﬂa-
tion and war of attrition truncation from Theorem 3 remains applicable with a simple
reﬁnement.
Maynard Smith (1974) ﬁrst formalized the war of attrition for theoretical biology.
Two animals ﬁght over a fallen prey, the ﬁrst to give up loses, and ﬁghting is costly for
both. Withmultipleplayers, payoffsareincreasinginthestoppingrank. Hendricksetal.
(1988)characterizeequilibriaofthecontinuous-timecompleteinformationwarofattri-
tion, while Bulow and Klemperer (1999) analyze a generalized N-player war of attrition
with incomplete information. Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) apply wars of attrition to
a duopoly exit game, Abreu and Pearce (2006) to bargaining. All-pay auctions and all-
pay contests have a similar ﬂavor, as only the last few/highest bids obtain the price; see
Siegel (2007) for a recent insightful paper.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Caller Number Five and related timing games 235
The pre-emption game has also been studied widely. Early work focused on tacti-
cal duels4: two-player zero-sum timing games played on a compact time-interval. Two
duelists shoot at each other with accuracy increasing in proximity; they may or may not
observe each other’s shot. Modern economic examples are aptly captured by the ‘Grab-
the-Dollar’ game: A player can either grab the money on the table or wait for one more
period; meanwhile, the pot increases by one unit. Players want to be the ﬁrst to take the
money, but would rather grab a larger pot. This example was ﬁrst outlined in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985) who apply the idea to analyze how ﬁrms decide when to adopt a new
technology. Recent examples are Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), who model ﬁnancial
bubbles (also with unobserved actions), Levin and Peck (2003, 2007), who look at mar-
ketentry, andBouisetal.(2006)andArgenzianoandSchmidt-Dengler(2008)whostudy
N-player investment dynamics.
In independent work, Sahuguet (2006) explores the equilibria of a three-player tim-
ing game with both pre-emption and attrition features. His payoffs are not rank-
dependent. In a recent paper, Laraki et al. (2005) (LSV) study the existence of equi-
libria in general timing games; they provide a very compelling argument for the exis-
tence of an -equilibrium in two-person timing games, and an existence argument for
twootherclasses(cumulativeandsymmetric, asdeﬁnedintheirpaper); theseexistence
results, however, do not overlap with our general existence and characterization theo-
rems.5 Amidstthislargeliteratureontiminggames,webelievethatourrespectiveworks
are the ﬁrst that provide a systematic treatment of classes of games that are neither just
a pre-emption game nor just a war of attrition. We hope that our analysis suggests a
wider and richer application of timing games in economics.6 Our work offers insight
into periodic unexpected rushes of uncertain size, followed by relative quiet.
Overview In Sections 2 and 3 we outline the model and derive the potential function
notion for the equilibrium analysis. In Section 4, we bound the numbers of equilibria
and phase transitions, and show how wars of attrition are truncated and pre-emptive
atoms inﬂated in equilibrium. Section 5 bounds the payoffs and game durations of our
equilibria. Section 6 discusses the results and potential extensions. Appendix A lays
out the equilibrium analysis for observable actions, Appendix B discusses other Nash
equilibria that we do not consider in the main text, and Appendix C contains proofs of
several lemmata that are used in the main text.
4In 1949, the RAND Corporation kick-started the study of duels (silent timing games) with a conference
with leading economists, statisticians, and economists. For an extensive survey, see Karlin (1959).
5OurexistenceresultsarenotsubsumedbyLSV. TheirTheorem1.2assumestwoplayers. LSVhaveother
existence results for more than two players, but none applies to our model: our payoffs are not cumulative
(Theorem1.3)orsymmetric(asdeﬁnedbyLSV,Theorem1.4). TheirTheorem1.5, whichmayadmitordinal
rank-payoffs, requires no time costs or discounting; also, it secures existence of a Nash equilibrium only if
an -equilibrium exists (which would thus need to be proven separately) for every .
6Shinkai (2000) develops a three-player Stackelberg-type game that ﬁts our rank-payoff formulation. In
his framework, quantity pre-emption and learning from predecessors’ choices interact to effectively form
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Figure 1. Plots of rewards structures. Left panel: A stylized War of Attrition reward structure
(gray, higher ranks yield higher rewards), and a stylized pre-emption game reward structure
(black,lowranksarebetter). Middlepanel: Hill-shapedrewardstructure(gray,themiddlerankis
best), and an ‘avoid-the-crowd’ U-shaped reward structure (black, either a very low or very high
rank is best). Right panel: Two general reward structures with multiple hills: there are multiple
‘locally’ optimal ranks.
2. A model of timing games with rank-dependent payoffs
Players There are N +12 identical players.
Strategies Play transpires in continuous time, starting at time t = 0. Players have to
decide whether ‘to stop’ or ‘not to stop’; they may stop only once; a stopping decision is
irrevocable. Actions are unobservable.
With unobservable actions, there is only one information set. A player’s strategy
speciﬁes when he will stop. A mixed strategy is a non-decreasing and right-continuous
cumulative distribution function (cdf) G : [0,1) ! [0,1], whose interpretation is that a
player stops with probabilityG(t) by time t or before.
Payoffs Upon stopping, a player receives a lump-sum reward that depends on his or-
dinal stopping rank. This payment is captured in the reward-function v :f1,...,N +1g!
R+. For instance, in a two-player war of attrition, v(1) = 0 and the prize is v(2) > 0. In
the Caller Number Five game, v(k) = 0 for all k 6= 5, and the prize is v(5) > 0. In gen-
eral, having more predecessors helps in a war of attrition, or v(k) < v(k +1) for all k.
In a pre-emption game, the situation is reversed, as having more predecessors hurts,
or v(k)v(k +1) for all k. See Figure 1 for various rank-reward structures.
Agents who stop at the same time equally share the respective rank rewards. This re-
ﬂects that players are anonymous and identical and that players do not control their
rank order among simultaneous stoppers.7 Assume that k 2 f0,...,Ng players have
stopped, and j + 1 2 f1,...,N   k + 1g players stop together. Then the atomic reward
is the average rank reward A(k,j) := (v(k +1)++v(k + j +1))=(j +1). For instance,
in a war of attrition, if both agents stop immediately, then their order is randomly deter-
mined, and they share the prize equally.
There are two types of explicit costs: discounting at the interest rate r  0, and ex-
ogenous participation costs c(t), with c(0)=0, ˙ c >0, and limt!1c(t)=1.8
7Alternatively, imagine that stoppers are randomly assigned one of the respective rank payoffs.
8In a related work, we also explore time beneﬁts.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Caller Number Five and related timing games 237
Equilibrium Players are ex ante identical and anonymous. It is then intuitive to ex-
plore symmetric strategy Nash equilibria. To avoid a continuum of arbitrary outcomes,
we conﬁne attention to equilibria whose cdfs have convex support starting at 0. (The
support of a cdfG is the set of all t withG(t +") G(t  ")> 0 for all " > 0.) To summa-
rize:
(E1) The support ofG is a connected interval [0,T] or [0,1).
Thisrestrictionisdesignedtoprecludeequilibriawithexplicitperiodsofsilencedue
to unspeciﬁed reasons—calendar time or random holidays (sunspots). But we argue
that it embodies a much stronger stationarity assumption. Appendix B proves that a
continuum of equilibria arises absent this assumption.
3. Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we outline several tools used in equilibrium analysis: necessary condi-
tions for mixed strategies, atomic stopping, potential functions, and general existence.
3.1 First-order conditions for continuous strategies
Consider a symmetric continuous strategyG. IfG(t)= g,9 then the expected payoff of a








g k(1  g)N kv(k +1).
Thefunction doesnotdependontheequilibriumandisaprimitiveofthegame. Specif-
ically, not only do the rank payoffs uniquely determine , but we can uniquely deduce





g k(1   g)N k are orthogonal and thus form a basis for the degree-N
polynomials (see, for instance, Milovanovi´ c et al. 1994). In other words, given the coef-
ﬁcients v(1),...,v(N +1), there is a unique expression  and given , there are unique
coefﬁcients v(1),...,v(N +1).
In any mixedstrategy equilibrium, an agent mustbe indifferent about stoppingany-
where strictly inside the support, so that expected payoffs are constant. Payoffs are dis-
counted rewards less discounted costs,
e rt[(G(t)) c(t)]. (1)
Assume ˙ G(t) exists. Then in equilibrium, payoffs are constant, and equating the
marginal exogenous costs and marginal strategic gains from delay, we get
˙ c +r((G) c)= ˙ G0(G) (2)
9In what follows we use g for realizations ofG and ˙ G for the derivative ofG (when it exists).238 Park and Smith Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
The numberG(t) is the probability that a player has stopped by time t, and soG is non-
decreasing. For a continuous and increasingG, the differential equation (2) implies that
˙ c +r((G) c) and 0(G) have the same sign. Now, ˙ c > 0 and r  0. Also, (G(t)) 
c(t), for otherwise, players would always be better off stopping at time 0 to get the non-
negative rank rewards v  0. So (2) is solvable only if 0(G) > 0. In summary, the delay
cost must be offset by a strategic delay incentive, so that advancing in the ranks yields
greater payoffs and compensates for the requisite delay.
Lemma 1 (Structure of equilibria). Any Nash equilibrium is described by a cdf G consist-
ing solely of atomic jumps and intervals on whichG is continuously differentiable.
While a cdf is monotone, and thus almost everywhere differentiable, the jumps may
bedensein(0,1)(theymaybethesetofallrationals),andtheremaybenon-jumppoints
whereG is not differentiable. Lemma 1, whose proof is in Section C.1, in the Appendix,
rules out both possibilities.
3.2 Analogy for atomic rewards: average vs. marginal revenue
Consider one player and suppose that the other N players, acting independently, have
stopped with probabilityG(t) = g by time t. At this time, each of the remaining players
stops with probability h   g, where h > g. We often refer to h   g as an atom or mass.
Thentheprobabilitythatplayersofranksk +1,...,k +j stopattimet equalsatrinomial
coefﬁcient N!=k!j!(N  k   j)! times g k(h   g)j(1 h)N k j. The expected payoff to a







k!j!(N  k   j)!
g k(h   g)j(1 h)N k jA(k,j).
Thus (0,h) is the payoff of an initial atom of size h, and (g,1) is the payoff of a termi-
nal atom of size 1  g. When 0 < g < h < 1, (g,h) is the average payoff in the interior
atom from g to h. Denote by (g) :=
R g
0 (s)ds the anti-derivative of (g). This moti-
vates the following result.
Lemma 2. (h) (g)=(h   g)(g,h).
The algebraic details of this proof are relegated to Section C.2. The intuition is the fol-
lowing. Independently place each of the N other players into the stopped, atom, and
remaining groups, with respective weights (g,h   g,1 h). The expected average rank
payoff in the ‘atom’ group is then ((h) (g))=(h   g), by deﬁnition of a conditional
expectation. But this is how we have deﬁned (g,h), and so these measures coincide.
This has a nice illustrative analogue in standard producer theory. When AR and MR
denoteaverageandmarginalrevenue,andq isquantity,thenMR AR=qAR0(q). Differ-
entiatingLemma2withrespecttoh directlyyields(h) (g,h)=(h g)(@ =@ h)(g,h).
Thisadmitsananalogousinterpretation: h g isthemassoftheatom, andcorresponds
tothequantity. Theexpectation(g,h)aggregatesandaveragesrewards,and(h)istheTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Caller Number Five and related timing games 239
derivativeofaggregated(non-averaged)rewards. Lemma2thusimpliesthat()crosses
(g,) from above at the local interior maxima of , and from below at the minima.
Since we can deduce  from , and vice versa,  is a primitive of the game too, and
sufﬁces to uniquely identify the rank payoffs. We henceforth identify the game by .
3.3 Equilibrium, potential functions, and existence
We have already speciﬁed that we consider only right-continuous cdfsG :[0,1)![0,1]
for symmetric Nash equilibria that have convex support, including 0 (labeled (E1) in
Section 2). In any equilibrium, net payoffs are constant along the support of play, and
there is no strict incentive to out-wait all other players. Conversely, these are sufﬁcient
conditions for a Nash equilibrium. An equilibrium is formally a cdf obeying the follow-
ing conditions.
(E2) e rt[(G(t))   c(t)] is the same constant for all times in the support of G with
G(t)<1.
(E3) IfG(t )>G(t  ), then (G(t  ))=(G(t  ),G(t ))(G(t )) (equal ifG(t )<1).
Since G is a cdf, it jumps at most countably many times, and is continuous on the
intervening intervals.10 By Lemma 1, any continuous portion of G is differentiable. To
ﬁnd an equilibrium cdfG, we thus solve the differential equation (2) subject to the right
boundary conditions, determine atomic jumps so that (E3) holds, and then ensure that
the boundary conditions reﬂect the atomic jumps.
We now develop an alternative representation of equilibrium in a single function.
This reformulation simpliﬁes our later analysis of the timing games by affording a short
proof of existence. More generally, in lieu of a potentially lengthy, complex, and ad hoc
equilibriumanalysis(likecomputingthenumberofequilibriaandequilibriumpayoffs),
we show how it sufﬁces to analyze a scalar function.
A C2 function  :[0,1]!R+ induces a strategyG for  if
 ˙ G =(˙ c +r[ 0(G) c])= 00(G) whenever  (G(t))=(G(t))
 if  6= on an interval (g,h), thenG() jumps from g to h.
We then say that the function  :[0,1]!R+ is a potential function11 with respect to  if
(P1)  (0)=0,  (1)=(1), and  0(1)0(1);
10We deduce later thatG can have only ﬁnitely many jumps.
11Our phrase “potential function” is in the spirit of a harmonic function whose derivatives describe the
gradientonaconservativevectorﬁeld. Closesttoourwork,inMyerson(1981),theconvexhullofintegrated
“virtual valuations” for the auction is a potential function; its derivatives ﬁx the priority level for allocating
thegood. HartandMas-Colell(1989)maybetheﬁrsttousethephrase“potentialfunction”ingametheory;
differences of their potential function yielded marginal payoff contributions in a transferable utility game.
Our concept bears no relation to the “potential games” literature—e.g., the potential function in Monderer
and Shapley (1996) is a function of the vector of quantities in an IO game. Our potential function maps
from a scalar probability.240 Park and Smith Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
(P2)   is monotonically increasing, convex, and continuously differentiable;
(P3) At each x 2(0,1), either  (x)=(x), or   is linear in an open interval around x.
The next lemma uniquely identiﬁes potential functions   and the equilibria of the
game . Before stating the result, we provide a couple of basic identities for . First,






















In other words,  (1) is the average rank payoff by (P1), while  0(1)(1)=v(N +1).
Lemma 3 (Equivalence). Fix . Any potential function   induces a unique equilibrium
cdf G, and any equilibrium cdf G is induced by a unique potential function  .
The proof is in Section C.3. In brief, ﬁx a potential function  . Differentiating  
yields the expected rank payoffs for any probability g, which are needed for the under-
lying differential equation of the induced equilibrium. At g = 0, this determines the
constant payoff for the induced equilibrium. Then, as time costs increase, rank payoffs
must increase, which is ensured by convexity. Linear segments in the potential function
correspond to atomic stopping, whose payoffs are given by the slope of the correspond-
ing linear segment. Since , the anti-derivative of , is a polynomial, it is arbitrarily
smooth; since   is continuously differentiable and smooth and either coincides with 
or is linear, at the join between a smooth and a linear segment the slopes of the smooth
and linear parts coincide. Thus the payoffs from the corresponding atom and the pay-
offs from slow play before and after the atom coincide.
Conversely, a potential function is found by setting (G(t))= (G(t)) wheneverG(t)
is left-continuous; increasing rank payoffs ensures the convexity of  . When G jumps
from g to h, there is a linear segment in   with endpoints (g,(g)) and (h,(h)); the
slope of this segment coincides with the atomic payoff, by Lemma 2. Since atomic and
non-atomic payoffs coincide in equilibrium, the slopes at the end points coincide, and
  is differentiable.
Theequivalencelemmaisimportantbecauseitidentiﬁeswhichgamefundamentals
matter for the equilibrium analysis. For instance, costs can only speed up or slow down
play. We can henceforth employ potential functions to prove theorems by alluding to
geometric or graphical properties of these functions.
Example 1 (Caller Number Two of Three). Assume N + 1 = 3 and v = (0,1,0). Then
(g) = 2g(1  g) and (g) = g 2(1 2g=3). There are exactly two potential functions.
First,   may initially equal , so that  1(g) = (g) for g  1=4 and  1(g) = 3g=8 1=24
for g > 1=4. Second,   may be initially linear, whereupon it remains linear on [0,1], by
convexity,differentiabilityand(P3):  2(g)= g=3. Thesepotentialfunctionsobeythekey
properties of smoothness, convexity and boundary values: e.g.  0
2(1)=1=3>0(1)=0.
Assume delay costs c(t) = t and no discounting. This determines the speed: the





















Figure 2. Examples 1 and 2 from Section 3: Caller Number Two of Three and U-Shaped Rank
Payoffs. The top left panel depicts the expected rank and expected atomic rank payoffs (g) and
(g,1)fortheCallerNumberTwoofThreegame. Thetoprightpanelplotstherunningintegralof
payoffs  and the potential function vex() identiﬁed in Theorem 1. For the U-shaped example,
the bottom left panel plots  and (0,g) and the bottom right panel plots  and the unique
potential function vex(). The plots also illustrate the theorems later on: both examples attain
the upper bound number two of phases (Theorem 2). Consistent with Theorem 3, the war of
attrition is truncated in each case. Just as in Theorem 4, there are two equilibria in the top game
(the potential function for the unit jump is not drawn), and one in the bottom game.
from (2), with solutionG(t)=1=2 1=2
p
1 2t untilG(t)=1=4. At that point, a jump to
G =1 occurs. The second equilibrium entails simply a time-0 jump toG =1. 
Example 2 (U-Shaped Rank Payoffs). Assume N +1 = 3 and v = (1,0,1). Then (g) =
(1  g)2 + g 2 and (g) = g(1+ g(2g=3 1)). Here there is a unique potential function
 3(g) = 5g=8 for g  3=4 and  3(g) = (g) for g > 3=4. Next, solving (2) yields 0 =
 1+2 ˙ G(t)(2G(t) 1), with solution 2G(t) = 1+
p
1=4+2t. Continuous play begins at
t =0, withG(0)=3=4. Figure 2 illustrates both examples. 
Inmechanismdesignproblems,non-monotonicpayofffunctionsareoften“ironed”
to produce a monotonic function (e.g. Baron and Myerson 1982). Namely, let vex()
be the convex hull of , i.e. the largest convex function with vex()(g)  (g) for ev-
ery g. The “ironed” function then is the derivative vex()0(g) (see Figure 3). Our po-
tential functions follow a similar idea. Since exogenous costs are ever-increasing, the




Figure 3. Ironing . The left panel illustrates the ironing procedure on , and the right panel
depicts both  and the convex hull of , called vex().
and these non-monotonicities must be ironed away. Our potential function describes
exactly how this works: its derivative is the rank payoff and its convexity ensures that
equilibrium payoffs increase. If the potential function contains a linear segment, then
rank payoffs are constant, and since delay is costly, atomic stopping must occur.
Theorem 1. A symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists and ends in ﬁnite time.
Proof. First, vex() exists, is a potential function, and thus induces an equilibrium.
Inanyequilibrium,payoffsareconstantonthesupportat(0). Sothereexists ˜ t <1
with maxg e rt[(g) c(t)] < (0) after ˜ t. Delaying beyond ˜ t is a dominated strategy,
as rewards are discounted or eaten by exogenous delay costs, given limt!1c(t)=1. 
In the Caller Number Two of Three example, vex()(g) =  1(g). In the U-shaped
example,  3(g) is the unique potential function, and therefore coincides with vex()(g).
4. Behavioral properties of equilibria
4.1 Phases and phases transitions
We ﬁrst bound the number of slope-sign changes of the expected rank rewards. Deﬁne
thesignvariationSV()ofthesequence=f0,1,...,ngasthenumberofsignchanges
left to right (zero terms being neglected). Analogously deﬁne the sign variation SV(f ) of
the bounded function f :[0,1]!R, i.e. SV(f )=supn SV(ff (t0),..., f (tn)g) where 0t0 <
t1 <...<tn 1. Denote by v(k)=v(k +1) v(k) the slope of v(k) at rank k and ﬁnally
put v :=fv(1),...,v(N)g.
Lemma 4 (Variationdiminishingpropertyofexpectedrankrewards). Theslope-signvari-
ations are ranked SV(v)  SV(0), and SV(v) SV(0) is an even number. Further, the
signs of the ﬁrst and last slopes of v and  coincide.
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Assume that SV(v) = m, i.e. the ﬁrst difference v(k) changes its sign m times. Scale























Obviously, P(z(g)) and 0(g) enjoy the same number of sign variations, i.e. positive real
roots of P. By Descartes’ Rule of Signs, this number is at most the number of sign
changes of its coefﬁcients a0,a1,...,aN. Also, if smaller, it is smaller by a multiple of
2. Thus SV(v)SV(0) and SV(v) SV(0) is even.
Finally, 0(0)=v(1) and 0(1)=v(N), proving the last clause. 
As noted earlier, this paper subsumes and extends two classes of standard timing
games. In a war of attrition, an exogenous delay cost opposes a strategic incentive to
outwait others. The reverse holds in a pre-emption game, where delay is exogenously
beneﬁcial,andplayerswishtopre-emptothers. Wenowcategorizegamephasesbytheir
strategic incentives. There is a war of attrition phase if ˙ G(t+)>0 exists and 0(G(t+))>
0 on (
¯
t, ¯ t). A pre-emptive explosion obtains ifG jumps at t, asG(t)>G(t ).
A phase transition occurs at some time t if below t we have one type of timing
game and above t we have another. If three game phases obtain, then there are two
phase transitions at t. In what follows, we shall drop the term ‘phase’ from the game
descriptions.
Theorem 2 (Phase transitions). (i) Equilibrium play consists solely of an alternating se-
quence of at most SV(v)+1 wars of attrition and pre-emptive explosions. There
are no slow pre-emption games, and pre-emptive atoms always subsume the por-
tions of the domain on which  is decreasing.
(ii) If  has m alternating slope signs, then SV(0) = m  1 and the maximal number
of phase transitions is m  1. This bound is attained in equilibrium if and only if
vex() touches every convex portion of .
This result implies that there are no slow pre-emption game phases.12 Intuitively, we
assume only exogenous costs of delay, and no beneﬁts, and thus there can be no oppo-
sition of strategic costs of delay and exogenous beneﬁts.
Proof. (i) Expected payoffs are constant along the support of play. Delay is exoge-
nously costly, and so a player’s expected rank reward payoff rises over time in equilib-
rium. If ever 0 < 0 on a segment of the support [0,1], then players must stop since
delay is both strategically and exogenously costly. So play involves slow war of attrition
phasesandpre-emptiveexplosions. Thenumberoftimesthat0 switchesfrompositive
to negative is bounded by SV(v) because  cannot have more interior extrema than v,
byLemma4. Thenumberofalternatingphasesisthusthenumberofswitchesplusone.
12Formally, a slow pre-emption game phase obtains if ˙ G(t+)>0 exists and 0(G(t+))<0 on (
¯
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Figure 4. The Zick-Zack Game. In this merger of Examples 1 and 2, rank payoffs twice change
slope, as v =(0, ,0,1). If v(2)=  (off the graph) is large enough, then the expected rank reward
 likewise has both a hill and a valley. Otherwise,  is monotonically increasing. The middle
panel plots the expected reward function  and reward functions for initial atoms (0,g) and
terminal atoms (g,1). The right panel plots (g) and vex()(g).
(ii) A phase transition occurs if and only if   switches from locally linear to strictly
convex or vice versa ( 00 > 0). The smooth   changes slope only when   = . As a non-
linear polynomial,  has at most as many strictly convex portions as  , with equality if
and only if (?):   touches each convex portion of . As vex() is a potential function, this
proves sufﬁciency. Next, assume (?). The smooth   includes the unique supporting tan-
gent line between all consecutive convex portions. The unique such potential function
is vex(). 
Onecanshowthatthemaximumnumberofphasetransitionsisattainedonlyifboth
the sequence of minima of (0,g) and the sequence of maxima of (g,1) are increasing.
Example 3 (Zick-Zack). The left panel of Figure 4 depicts the four-player game Zick-
Zack, with rank rewards v =(0, ,0,1), with  >0. We have
(g)=3g(1  g)2  + g 3 1 and 0(g)=3 (2g  1)2 +3(1  )g 2
(g)=

1=4(1 (1  g)4)  g(1  g)3
 + g 4=4.
Analyzing (g), one can see that (g) is monotonic for    1 =:
¯
 , even though the
underlyingrankrewardstructurev hastwoslope-signchanges. Thisillustratesthestrict
inequality in Lemma 4, by a multiple of two. Then  is convex with the unique potential
function =vex(); thus there are no phase transitions (Theorem 2(i)).
If   >
¯
 , then  has two slope-sign changes, like v. The fourth-degree polynomial
 thus has two points of inﬂection, and vex() must contain at least one linear portion.
Hence, there can be at most two phase transitions (Theorem 2(i)).
Next, vex()touchesboththeﬁrstandsecondconvexportionsoffor
¯
   ¯  :=
(5+
p
33)=4. By Theorem 2(ii), the associated equilibrium has the maximum number of
phase transitions (two): war of attrition, pre-emptive atom, and then war of attrition. 
We have shown that  smoothes out rank payoffs relative to v, reducing the num-
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rank payoffs v. One could naïvely imagine that each slope-sign change of the smooth
function  initiates a phase transition. The naïve equilibrium would be one where a
war of attrition obtains if and only 0 > 0 and a pre-emption game obtains if and only
if 0 < 0. This is not what happens in equilibrium. First of all, while  may be non-
monotonic, theonlyequilibriummaywellbeauniquepre-emptiveatom—forinstance,
with v = (2,0,1). More subtly, the slope 0 does not by itself determine the current tim-
ing game, because the relation of marginal and average rewards,  and , is critical.
Pre-emptive atoms subsume intervals when  is decreasing, by Theorem 2(i); hence the
atom is larger than necessary to reach a level of G, so that 0 > 0; we thus say that the
atom is ‘inﬂated’ relative to an atom that would be prescribed by the naïve direct-sum.
The reverse, i.e. inﬂation of war of attrition phases, does not occur, as we now ﬂesh out.
Theorem 3 (Truncation and atom-inﬂation). Pre-emptive atoms are inﬂated and wars
of attrition truncated: Any pre-emptive atom subsumes at least some portion of the adja-
cent intervals where  is increasing, and where a war of attrition is played.
Proof. Alinearportionofapotentialfunction mustbeacommontangenttodistinct
convex portions of , and corresponds to a pre-emptive explosion. If this tangent joins
non-adjacent convex portions, then the atom is strictly inﬂated, as it subsumes at least
oneentirewarofattritionphase. Itthereforesufﬁcestoconsideracommontangentof
adjacent convex portions. Without inﬂation, such a  must touch at consecutive points
of inﬂection of , i.e. where 0(g)=0. This is impossible, as it would slice through . 
For instance, in Example 1 (Caller Number Two of Three), at most one phase tran-
sition occurs, since 0 changes sign just once, from positive to negative when g = 1=2.
Observe that the ODE deﬁning the war of attrition is deﬁned until time t = 1=2. While
this may be its natural termination point, terminal atomic rewards are too small at that
moment. Indeed, the atom would have sizeG(1=2)=1=2, and (1=2,1)=1=3<(1=2)=
1=2. Hence, the atom must be for smaller g, whence (g) and (g,1) cross. This occurs
when (g,1) has a maximum at g = 1=4, i.e. G(3=8) = 1=4. This is before time t = 1=2,
hence truncation.
4.2 The number of equilibria
Wenowﬁndthatthenumberofequilibriaispotentiallyquitelarge—abouttworaisedto
the number of phase transitions. Speciﬁcally, let Em denote the set of symmetric Nash
equilibria, where m is the number of alternating slope signs of . Given the expected
rank rewards , we can tie down the maximal cardinality of Em.13
Theorem 4 (Number of equilibria). Assume  has exactly m alternating slope signs.
Then the maximum number of equilibria jEmj is 2jJmj, where Jm is the set of up-slopes of
 followed by down-slopes.
13For a recent contribution on the number of Nash equilibria in Normal form games, see McLennan
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Proof. An equilibrium implies a unique set of up-slopes played (the common tangent
onpairsofstrictlyconvexportionsofisunique). Indeed,aninitialdown-slopepriorto
Jm does not affect the number of equilibria, as the down-slope is skipped in a jump. A
terminal up-slope likewise does not affect the number of equilibria. It is either skipped
by a pre-emptive atom or played in a war of attrition, but not both. So there is a 1–1 map
from equilibria Em to sets Jm—hence, the power set enumeration for the upper bound
of jEmj. 
The number of slopes m (up-down-...or down-up-...) is either odd or even. Sup-
pose  slopes up at g = 0. We then have to ﬁnd the number of up-slopes followed by
down-slopes: if m is even, this number k satisﬁes m = 2k; if m is odd then m = 2k +1.
The theorem states that the maximal number of equilibria is jE2kj,jE2k+1j  2k. Like-
wise, if  slopes down at g = 0, then when m is odd, the number of up-slopes followed
by down-slopes satisﬁes m =2k  1 so that jE2k 1j,jE2kj2k 1.
For instance, the standard war of attrition has one slope sign, and thus has jE20+1j=
20 = 1 equilibrium. The U-shaped game (Example 2) has two slopes, but slopes down
ﬁrst, so that it has at most jE21j = 21 1 = 1 equilibrium. Caller Number Two of Three
(Example 1) has m = 2 slopes, and exactly one up-slope followed by a down-slope, so
that there are maximally jE21j=21 equilibria.
ForZick-Zack(Example3)thetheoremassertsthattheterminalup-slopeshouldnot
affect the maximum number of equilibria, i.e. still jE21+1j  21. Why? Clearly, if    1,
then the unique equilibrium is a war of attrition. If   > 1, then  has two points of
inﬂection, and there are three possible potential functions. The ﬁrst begins with a linear
segment 0 that touches the second convex portion of  and is then strictly convex.
The second is strictly convex, ending with a linear portion through (1,(1)). This linear
segment 1 is tangent to the ﬁrst convex portion of  and must have slope  0(1)  0(1).
The last potential function has a linear segment  in the interior of [0,1] which is the
unique common tangent to the ﬁrst and second convex portions of .
By construction, each of these potential functions is unique—if it exists. Observe
that the tangent  necessarily ﬁrst touches  at some g 2 (0,1), because 0(0) = (0) =
0<(g)=0(g)for g >0. However,itssecondtouchpointoccursatsomeinteriorh <1
only in some conditions, namely if and only if  2[
¯
 , ¯  ). Moreover, as is geometrically
clear, the tangents  and 1 coincide at the very moment that   = ¯  . The tangent 1
in fact exists for   
¯
 1 := (11+3
p
17)=16. But its slope only weakly exceeds 0(1) for
  ¯  , where ¯  >
¯
 1. Altogether, 1 is part of a potential function if and only if   ¯  .
This illustrates why the terminal up-slope in Zick-Zack does not increase the num-
ber of equilibria relative to the Caller Number Two of Three game: tangent 1 represents
aterminalatomskippingthelastup-slope,whilecorrespondstoaninterioratomafter
which the terminal up-slope is played. Precisely one of the two obtains.
One can ﬁnally show that the initial tangent 0 exists for 9=5 :=
¯
 0     3 := ¯  0.
For > ¯  0, 0 isnolongertangenttothesecondconvexportionof. Forwhen = ¯  0,
0 becomes a straight line from the origin to (1,(1)) corresponding to a time zero unitTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Caller Number Five and related timing games 247




When is the maximum number of equilibria attained? One may be tempted to
think it sufﬁcient that vex() touches all convex portions of , as in Theorem 2(ii). But





touches both convex portions of , and yet the induced equilibrium is unique.
Evenwhenthemaximalnumberofequilibriaisattained,noequilibriumneedattain
the maximal number of phase transitions. In Zick-Zack, both equilibria have only one
phase transition for  > ¯  , while the most phase transitions is two, by Theorem 2(i).
So how does one ﬁnd all the equilibria? First, one identiﬁes all convex portions of .
Next, one determines all possible pairwise connections between these convex portions;
these are the lines that are tangent to two such portions. For each non-overlapping
combination of these lines, one veriﬁes whether convexity is preserved, i.e. the slopes
of these lines are successively increasing. Then one combines all such feasible combi-
nations of linear segments with the adjacent smooth, convex portions of  so that the
combination spans the entire domain [0,1]. Ensuring each time that (P1) is satisﬁed
ﬁnally yields the potential functions that induce the equilibria.
5. Equilibrium payoffs
Our analysis using potential functions allows us to see how the qualitative features of
equilibrium play depend separately on time costs and rank rewards. This dichotomy is
the essential reason for the simplicity of our analysis: the size and location of atoms in
probability space owes to rank payoffs, while the speed of wars of attrition depends on
the time cost of delay. Theorem 5 illustrates this insight in the context of total welfare.
We now ask what is each player’s expected payoff, and how much “rent” is lost by
delay. In the unobserved actions pure war of attrition, the (common) expected payoff
is the initial rank reward (0) = v(1), and all rents are dissipated, namely the differ-
ence (1) (0) = v(N +1) v(1) between highest and lowest rank payoffs—the total
variation in rank payoffs. But with non-monotonic rank payoffs, the total variation of
rank-payoffs is no longer the tightest bound on payoff dissipation.
To make simple statements about expected payoffs, we make a simple assumption
aboutdelaycosts. Weassumenodiscountingandconstantmarginalparticipationcosts,
c(t)=t, so that rent dissipation coincides with the length of the play.
Theorem 5 (Payoffs). Assume no discounting and linear participation costs c(t)=t.
(i) Fixanequilibriumcorrespondingtoagivenpotentialfunction . Thentheexpected





 1 thresholds are most easily obtained via (0,g) and (g,1). First, (0,g) has an interior
maximum and minimum for all  
¯
 0, and is monotonic for smaller  . If a potential function starts with
a linear portion, then 0 is tangent to (g) exactly when (g) and (0,g) intersect at an interior minimum
of(0,g). ThemiddlepanelofFigure4illustratesthispoint. Thethreshold ¯  0 for allows(g)and(0,g)
to cross at g =1. The computations for
¯
 1 follow similar lines of reasoning using (g,1). Finally, the payoff
from the interior maximum of (g,1) coincides with (1) at ¯  .248 Park and Smith Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
(ii) The equilibrium with the least expected payoff and maximal length corresponds
to vex(). Thus, the least value is vex()0(0) and the greatest length is vex()0(1) 
vex()0(0).
For a given potential function, the equilibrium expected payoff of the game is a local
minimumoftheforward-lookingaveragerewards;thegamelastsuntilalocalmaximum
of backward average rewards obtains. Moreover, the least expected payoff of the game
is the global minimum of the forward average payoffs, and the maximal time elapse
likewise occurs when the global maximum backward average rewards are reached.
Proof. (i)Fixapotentialfunction . Sincethemixedstrategyensuresaconstantpayoff
along the support of play, the expected payoff of the game is the time zero payoff  0(0).
By Theorem 1 the game ends in ﬁnite time. The length of play depends on the payoffs
dissipated—the higher the payoff they can obtain, the longer people are willing to delay.
Since expected rank-payoffs must increase along the support of play, the largest rank-
payoff  0(1) obtains when the game ends.
(ii) Suppose, counterfactually, that  0(0) < vex()0(0) for some potential function  .
Since vex()   everywhere, we have vex()0(0)  0(0), and thus  0(0) < 0(0). Then  
is initially linear by (P3). But differentiability and (P3) jointly imply that   can change
slopes only while tangent to . If this happens at g 2 (0,1), then vex()(g)  (g) =
 (g)= 0(0)g <vex()0(0)g. This violates convexity of vex().
Similarly, at g =1 we have  0(1)vex()0(1) for any potential function  . 
Thisresultextendsthestandardwarofattritionwithmonotonicrankrewards: when
 is monotonic,  is globally convex, and the only potential function is  itself. The ex-
pectedpayoffis0(0)=(0)=v(1)andthemaximallengthis0(1) 0(0)=(1) (0)=
v(N +1) v(1). In fact, by (P3) and Theorem 5(ii), this is the length of any unobserved
actions game where vex() begins and ends on a strictly convex portion.
Since rank payoffs are smoothed in  with unobserved actions, the total variation
in  = 0 is a tighter upper bound on payoff dissipation (e.g. Figure 4, left). But war
of attrition phases are truncated, and even this measure is not tight enough. The length
andexpectedpayoffdependontheslopesoftheinitialandterminaltangents0 and1.
In Caller Number Two of Three, vex() is strictly convex for g  1=4 and linear with
slope 3=8 for g > 1=4. The expected payoff is (0) = 0 and the maximum length of
the game is 3=8. In the U-shaped example, vex() is linear with slope 5/8 for g < 3=4
and strictly convex for g  3=4. The expected payoff in the game is the ﬁrst expected
rank payoff in the war of attrition, (3=4) = 5=8, and the maximum elapse time equals
(1) (3=4)=3=8.
In Zick-Zack, with rank rewards (0, ,0,1), vex() is the potential function that starts
with a strictly convex portion. Thus, the minimum expected rank payoff is (0) = 0.
For   
¯
 ,  is strictly convex, and the unobserved actions game is equivalent to a
war of attrition. If   2 (
¯
 , ¯  ), vex() touches both convex portions of  and hence
vex()0(0) = (0) and vex()0(1) = (1). Thus, the maximum duration is (1) (0) = 1,
which is below the total variation   in rank payoffs. Finally, for  > ¯  , vex() ends withTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Caller Number Five and related timing games 249
a linear portion, and the terminal payoff is governed by the slope of the tangent 1. The
maximum duration exceeds (1) (0), but is still less than the total variation of .
Moregenerally, theequilibriumpayoffisunaffectedbythespeciﬁcsofthecostfunc-
tion or the discount rate—and is still  0(0), as in Theorem 5. Rent dissipation  0(1) de-
termines the length of play, i.e. t solves e rt[ 0(1) c(t)]=  0(0). The solution is unique
since ˙ c > 0. In other words, Theorem 5 is immediately amenable to applications with a
nonconstant cost function c(t) or discounting.
What aboutthe most efﬁcient equilibrium? If (1)0(1), then (p)=p(1)is a po-
tential function, and clearly corresponds to a time-0 complete atom. But if (1) < 0(1),
then a time-0 jump is no longer an equilibrium. In some of these cases, we can iden-
tify the most efﬁcient equilibrium, but we have found no clear theorem. For there are
examples where the equilibrium with the greatest expected payoff is not the quickest.
Assuming that 00(1 ) = 0(1 ) > 0, for instance, if we can construct a tangent 
from the origin to the last convex portion of , tangent at some ¯ p 2 (0,1], then it is





expected payoff is higher. Also, for   < ¯  0, its terminal slope is  0(1) = 0(1) = (1) = 1,
which is weakly smaller than vex()0(1). Thus, it is the shortest equilibrium. For   ¯  0,
the atom is complete; this equilibrium is the shortest with the maximal expected payoff.
6. Conclusion
The timing game literature has long been partitioned into wars of attrition and pre-
emption games. The incentive structure for both varieties of timing games ﬁnds a com-
mon home in this paper. We introduce the idea of potential functions into this class of
timing games, using them to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria. This affords a
short existence proof and tractable analysis of these equilibria. The resulting equilibria
are rich, with interior atomic explosions that may be preceded or followed by slow wars
of attrition. Further, the two types of timing games interact with each other, with antic-
ipation of later phases inﬂuencing current play. Thus, the moments for the explosions
are advanced in time relative to a naïve “direct sum”.
Two extensions of our work come to mind: exogenous payoff growth over time and
observed actions. We pursue the former in other work, and in Appendix A we brieﬂy
argue that our insights extend to observable actions.
Appendix
A. Lessons for observable actions
Once actions are observed, the model grows substantially more complex. Subgame per-
fectequilibrium(SPE)isthemandatedsolutionconcept. Sinceplayerscanseethegame
unfolding, there are now multiple information sets, one for each number of remaining
players. There are therefore far more equilibria, since the number of remaining players
itselfcanserveasacoordinationdevice. WethusconﬁneattentiontosymmetricSPEfor250 Park and Smith Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
which players engage in a war of attrition whenever possible, and a pre-emption game
only when necessary. This substitutes for the stationarity condition for Nash equilib-
rium. For intuitively, a pre-emptive atom requires a high degree of coordination, and
a war of attrition needs no coordination at all. Despite this reﬁnement which seeks to
minimizetheroleofpre-emptiongames,wenowarguethatourmainqualitativeﬁnding
still obtains: wars of attrition are truncated, and pre-emption atoms inﬂated.
Let w(k +1) be the expected SPE payoff from the subgame after k have stopped.
Lemma 5. A war of attrition obtains if v(k +1) < w(k +2) while a pre-emptive atom of
some size p 2(0,1] occurs if v(k +1)w(k +2).
Proof. Any p < 1 must equate the expected rank payoffs from the continuation game















Now, the left-hand side of (3) is ﬂatter than its right-hand side at p = 0, for comparing
slopes yields
(N  k)(v(k +2) v(k +1))=2+(N  k)(w(k +2) v(k +1))<(N  k)(v(k +2) v(k +1))=2
since w(k +2) v(k +1) < 0. Both sides are continuous in p and coincide for p = 0.
Thus, they either intersect again for some p  1, or, if not, the right-hand side atomic
payoff dominates the left-hand side continuation payoff for all p, and a complete atom
must obtain. 
Assuming again a constant cost of delay c(t) = t, the expected length of the war is
w(k +2) v(k +1), while its expected payoff is v(k +1) =: w(k +1). Assume that rank
payoffs rise from j to k. We say that a war of attrition is truncated in time if its expected
duration is less than v(k) v(j). Call a war of attrition weakly truncated (i.e. in ranks)
if it nowhere obtains in fj,...,kg, or if it obtains from j 0 to k0 for some j  j 0 < k0  k.
Likewise, if rank payoffs fall from j to k, the pre-emption game is weakly inﬂated (in
ranks) if it obtains from j 0 to k0 for some j 0  j and k0  k. Once an atom occurs, there
is further atomic stopping until a war of attrition subgame is reached.
(}) All rank payoffs on down-slopes are more valuable than the overall average re-
maining payoff, or v(k +1)>A(k,N  k) whenever v(k +1)<v(k), for any k.
Theorem 6. Assume (}). Wars of attrition are truncated in time and weakly truncated in
ranks, and pre-emptive atoms are weakly inﬂated.
Proof. As players are symmetric, they cannot expect to gain more than the average
remaining rank payoff, w(k +1)A(k,N  k). So (}) implies v(k +1)>w(k +1).
A war of attrition along an up-slope from a minimum rank
¯
k to ¯ k lasts at most time
w(¯ k) v(
¯
k); it is thus truncatedin thetime dimension fromthe naïve lengthv(¯ k) v(
¯
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Atomic stopping obtains whenever v(k) > w(k +1). Assume that there are subse-
quentup-slopesofrank-rewards. Iftheatomiscomplete,thenitisclearlyinﬂated. Ifthe
atom is incomplete, then with positive probability play continues on the same down-
slope. But then v(k) > v(k +1) > w(k +1), and another atom follows immediately. So
once atomic stopping starts, it stops only when play begins weakly on an up-slope. 
Corollary 1. Assume (}). Thelowestexpectedequilibriumpayoffwithunobservableac-
tions, vex0()(0), is a lower bound for the expected payoff in an observable actions setting.
Thiscorollarycan, ofcourse, beappliedalsotoeverysubgameoftheobservableactions
setting, where vex0()(0) is computed for the unobservable actions game with N +1 k
players. The corollary is a direct consequence of vex0()(0) constituting a global mini-
mum of the right-hand side of (3). It is not true, however, that vex()0(1) vex()0(0) is
a bound on the elapse time: this is due to the fact that rank payoffs become left trun-
cated as people stop. Hence vex()0(1) has no direct counterpart relation in a setting
with observable actions.
Corollary 2. Assume (}). There are at most as many phases as slope signs of v(k).
B. Other Nash equilibria
Assumption (E1) restricts the set of equilibria we consider. We now argue that relaxing
either of the restrictions of (E1) introduces a continuum of other equilibria.
If we drop the assumption that 0 belongs to the support, then a continuum of equi-
libria may arise as follows.15 Suppose that in the set of equilibria that we identify there
is one with an atom at time zero and  0(0) > (0), as occurs in Caller Number Two of
Three. Then there is a maximum time t such that e rt [ 0(0) c(t)] = (0). And for
every s 2(0,t], play according to   starting at time s is an equilibrium.
Similarly, if we abandon the requirement of a convex support, then a continuum of
equilibria can be constructed. The idea behind such a construction is to have an atom
from g to h that pays more than expected rank payoffs (g). To make this an equilib-
rium, the beneﬁts of the atom must be destroyed (because payoffs in a mixed strategy
must be constant on the support). In our setting this payoff destruction is achieved by
prescribing sufﬁcient delay (which is costly) until the atom occurs. (And pre-empting
such an atom does not pay precisely because the rank payoff from pre-emption, (g),
is smaller than the atomic payoff.) Economically, these kinds of atom require implicit
sunspot coordination, and for this reason we believe that these equilibria are very un-
appealing.
More elaborately, one way to construct a continuum of equilibria in absence of the
convexsupportassumptiongoesasfollows. Supposethat prescribesanatomattimeti
from i to i+1, and G(ti) = i. Also assume i+1 < 1, i.e. the atom is not terminal.
Now pick a small  > 0, and compute G(t    ) =:  
i < i. Let  
i+1 < i+2 be a
solution so that ( 
i ,+
i+1) = (+
i+1) > (i+1) (since the atom at i is not termi-
nal, for small enough  such a +
i+1 2 (i+1,i+2) exists by Lemma 4). Finally let 











. Such a  exists be-
cause ( 
i ) < (+





declines monotonically in t.
Then the following is an equilibrium: play   until time ti  ; be inactive from ti   until
ti +; stopinanatomofsize+
i+1  
i attimeti +; playtheportionof thatisdeﬁned
for 2[+
i+1,1] thereafter for t >ti +. Conceptually this equilibrium without a convex
support is quite similar to the equilibrium that we specify with convex support.
C. Other proofs
C.1 Equilibrium structure: Proof of Lemma 1
Fix t in the interior of the support of G, and assume that G does not jump at t. Since
payoffs(1)areconstantonthesupport, payoff e rt((G(t)) c(t))=: >0isaconstant
when G(t) < 1. But this forces G to be differentiable at t. Since  is a degree N poly-
nomial, 0 = 0 at most N  1 times, between which 0 is positive or negative. There are
three cases to consider.





Case 2 If 0(G(t))<0 at t, then (G(t) )>(G(t))>(G(t)+) for all small enough
 > 0. Since t is inside the support of G, but is not in an atom, there exists  >
0 with (G(t)   ) > (G(t   )) > (G(t)) > (G(t + )) > (G(t) + ). Since
e r(t ) >e rt and c(t  )<c(t), a constant payoff is impossible because
e r(t )((G(t  )) c(t  ))>e rt((G(t)) c(t)).
In other words, 0(G(t))<0 cannot obtain in equilibrium.
Case 3 Suppose 0(G(t)) = 0 at t. If this is a saddle point with 0 < 0 left and right
of G(t), then G(t) =  1(c(t) + ert ) locally. But this is decreasing, and so not
a solution. Otherwise, 0 > 0 is increasing on at least one side of G(t), where
G(t)= 1(c(t)+ert ) locally describes the unique smooth solution of the ODE.
Finally, if t = 0 or if the support interval of G is [0,t], then the argument that G is
differentiable (right or left, respectively) is a slight modiﬁcation of the above analysis.
C.2 Relation of atomic and expected rewards: Proof of Lemma 2
We show that (h) (g,h)=(h  g)@ (g,h)=@ h; the result from the lemma follows by
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Fix v(k +1) and collect all terms on the right hand side that contain v(k +1). These are
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(1 h)N k hk =(k,h). 
C.3 Potential function equivalence: Proof of Lemma 3
Fix a potential function  . By (P1) it is convex, and so there are at most countably many
intervals on which it is linear. Consider any such interval [,]. First,  () = (), by










 0()=0() if  >0.254 Park and Smith Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
So (E2) obtains: stoppers earn identical payoffs just before atomic stopping if  > 0, for
then (,) equals 0() = (), and after atomic stopping if  < 1, since 0() = ().
Also, (E1) holds, as expected rank payoffs are positive, by  () >  (). If  = 1, then
(1)=0(1) 0(1)=(,1) by (P1); so (E3) holds.
Assume   =  on [,], so that  = 0 =  0 (which exists by (P2)). We then need
not worry about (E3). Since   is convex by (P2) and  is smooth, we have 0 =  00 
0. Also,  is strictly increasing inside the interval, being a nonconstant polynomial;
thus (E1) holds, as 0 can only initially vanish. Assume that G(
¯
t) =  for some
¯
t  0.
Thus, the ODE ˙ G = (˙ c +r[(G) c])=0(G) in (2) admits the “constant payoff” solution
e rt[(G(t))  c(t)] = (0) =  0(0), which is the initial payoff—recalling that the sup-
port of G must include 0. This gives (E2). Let C(t) := c(t)+ert 0(0). Since  is strictly
increasing on (,),G(t)= 1(C(t)) obtains on the domain (
¯
t, ¯ t), where ¯ t =C 1().
Next, ﬁx an equilibrium G. Deﬁne the potential function   as follows. First,  (g) =
(g) wheneverG is continuous atG 1(g). Next, at any jump from g to h,   is the linear
function through (g,(g)) and (h,(h)). Using constant payoffs (E2), (E3), and (g) =








(h) with equality if h <1
=(g)= 0(g) if g >0.
(4)
This gives (P3) and also (P2):   is increasing since  0 =  > 0 by (4), and convex (  is
linear, or has slope , which is increasing by (E2)).
Finally, we show (P1). If  = near 1, then  (1)=(1) and  0(1)=0(1). If  = near
0, then  (0) = (0). If G(t) starts with a jump from 0 to h, then   has a linear segment
withslope(h)=h through(h,(h)). Thisforces (0)=0. IfG endswithajumpto1, then
 0(1) is the ﬁnal linear slope, i.e.  0(1)(1)=0(1) by (4).
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